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TOP SECRET [redacted] (b)(3)

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Final Version
21 July 98

FOREIGN KNOWLEDGE OF US INTELLIGENCE

AND ITS D&D IMPLICATIONS

Statement of [redacted] (b)(3)

Deputy NIO for Science & Technology

National Intelligence Council

for the

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

23 July 1998

Good Morning Mr. Chairman.

I am [redacted] Deputy National Intelligence Officer (b)(3)
for Science and Technology, and Executive Secretary of the Foreign Denial and Deception Committee. I am pleased to be here to address the important question you've asked about the extent of foreign knowledge of US intelligence and its implications for denial and deception. [redacted] (b)(3)

We have just completed a National Intelligence Estimate on foreign denial and deception (D&D) under the auspices of Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, NIO/S&T, who very much wanted to be here, but is abroad today with his family on a well deserved vacation scheduled some months ago. I served as Project

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- The declassification of Cold War intelligence products, and more recently, documents related to the Gulf War.

- [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

These many sources of information combine to present a fairly detailed mosaic about how we undertake intelligence, and the overall impact of successive disclosures is cumulative. For those who make it their business to understand US intelligence—and foreign counterintelligence services give this some priority—their potential data base is substantial, and growing. [redacted] (b)(3)

I would like to elaborate just a bit on four of these sources because our ability to modulate this outflow of information varies greatly, as does their resulting damage to US intelligence collection efforts. [redacted] (b)(3)

Foreign espionage. Spies have hurt us greatly, and test the best of our counterintelligence capabilities. The

--VUGRAPH ON SPIES—(2)

Ames case, for example, was particularly damaging because of the volume of finished intelligence he passed exposing many

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aspects of imagery, [redacted] and even MASINT, as well as some analytical techniques. Earlier spies for the Soviet Union such as Walker, Pelton, Howard, Souther, and Hall had provided significant information that the Ames material certainly amplified. Other spies like Chin have passed intelligence to China that has likewise aided Chinese D&D efforts. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

Unauthorized disclosures. We've lost much sensitive information about our sources and methods, through unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This happens in books and articles, for example, by persons who have had clearances, then use classified materials in their publications. As you know, some journalists exploit excellent contacts among readers of classified publications and make disclosures about US intelligence on almost a daily basis. [redacted] (b)(3)

In 1997 alone, CIA opened [redacted] cases investigating unauthorized disclosures, of which [redacted] were referred to the Justice department for criminal investigation. The Department of Defense referred [redacted] cases to Justice during 1997, of which [redacted] disclosures. Preliminary data for 1998 indicate that we are well ahead of last year's pace—in word, the problem of unauthorized disclosures seems to be getting worse, not (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

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